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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND IPO UNDERPRICING:  
A MULTI-LEVEL KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW 
 
Abstract 
Prior studies of IPO underpricing, mostly using agency theory and single-country samples, have 
generally fallen short. In this study, we employ the knowledge-based view (KBV) to explore 
underpricing across 17 countries. We find that agency indicators are insignificant predictors, 
board of director knowledge limits underpricing, and external knowledge both substitutes for and 
complements internal board knowledge. This third finding suggests that future KBV studies 
should consider how internal and external knowledge states interact with each other. Our study 
offers new insights into the antecedents of underpricing and extends our understanding of 
comparative governance and the KBV of the firm.  
 
Keywords: IPO Underpricing, Corporate Governance, Knowledge-Based View, Cross-National 
Sample, Multi-Level Models 
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Since the 1970s, it has been observed that IPOs are routinely underpriced (sold at a discount) at 
their initial offering, which represents a systematic failure of the marketplace and directly 
challenges standard economic theory (Ibbotson, 1975).  IPO underpricing appears pervasive 
across capital markets throughout the world, with IPO underpricing in a sample of 49 countries 
ranging, on average and by country, from 3.5 to 56 percent (Boulton, Smart and Zutter, 2010). 
The dominant explanation for underpricing has been based on the assumption that 
asymmetric information creates a moral hazard due to a principal-agent and/or principal-
principal conflict (Ritter, 2003). However, this traditional line of thinking has received relatively 
limited empirical support (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Daily et al., 2003). In addition, most prior 
work has ignored differences in the environment external to the firm to explain underpricing, as 
home-country characteristics have repeatedly been shown to influence IPO outcomes (Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stultz, 2011).   
 In this study, we take a fresh theoretical perspective by framing our investigation using 
the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996) within a cross-national sample of 
firms. Specifically, we explore the notion that the knowledge possessed by the board of directors 
directly influences the level of underpricing experienced by “entrepreneurial threshold firms” 
entering public equity markets (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). In addition, we explore the idea 
that the specific environment in which firms operate can provide firms with more or less 
knowledge (Reus et al., 2009), thereby influencing the impact of the board on IPO underpricing.  
By examining both the direct effect of board knowledge and the interaction effect 
between board knowledge and knowledge external to the firm on IPO underpricing, our study 
provides key new insights on board-governance effectiveness.  In addition, this study is 
responsive to recent calls to consider cross-national differences regarding governance behaviors 
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and outcomes (Moore et al., 2012). Therefore, ours is the first multi-level study to apply the 
KBV to a cross-national sample of firms to better understand IPO underpricing differences.  
A KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW OF IPO UNDERPRICING 
The KBV focuses on key knowledge workers operating inside the firm to explain organizational 
outcomes. The theory and research have repeatedly shown that the overall state of knowledge 
varies by firm, and that a greater extent of firm knowledge tends to be associated with desirable 
firm outcomes (Grant, 1996). Because the IPO process involves the assembly and distribution of 
new knowledge and information as the firm attempts to attract new investors and convey its 
“true” value to public-market investors (Ritter and Welch, 2002), it may be a useful framework 
to explore the determinants of underpricing outcomes.   
The few empirical studies utilizing the KBV to explain IPO outcomes seem to support the 
validity of this theoretical framework in the exploration of IPO’s outcomes. For example, Bach, 
Judge and Dean (2008) found that its predictions were helpful in explaining long-term IPO 
performance for computer firms going public for the first time in the United States. More 
recently, Arend, Patel and Park (2014) demonstrated that KBV predictions are fairly well 
supported in explaining moderate and long-term IPO outcomes for high-technology 
manufacturing firms based in the USA.  
Based on this recent and encouraging empirical support for the KBV with respect to IPO 
outcomes, we focus on the potential influence of board knowledge on IPO underpricing in this 
study. Board members are key decision-makers in the IPO process and have a major influence on 
its eventual outcomes (Sanford, 2012). Moreover, previous studies have provided empirical 
support regarding the significant role of board knowledge in affecting a number of firm 
outcomes. For example, Filatotchev et al. (2003) empirically demonstrated that board knowledge 
was positively associated with firm restructuring in transition economies. More recently, 
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Barroso, Villegas and Perez-Calero (2011) showed that board knowledge was positively 
associated with international diversification of Spanish firms. And most relevant to this study, 
Bedard, Coulombe and Courteau (2008) found that board knowledge was negatively associated 
with IPO underpricing in Canadian firms. 
Internal board knowledge and IPO underpricing  
While top management, working in concert with external advisors, often does most of the work 
related to going public, it is the board’s responsibility to understand the information presented, to 
challenge underlying assumptions and, ultimately, to direct the overall process and decide on the 
offering price and specific timing of the IPO. In other words, a broad coalition of managers and 
advisors all contribute to determining the initial offering price (Pollock, Porac and Wade, 2004), 
but it is the board of directors which is central to this process, and the focus of this study.  
One of the key handbooks on undertaking an IPO describes the board's role as follows: 
The board’s fiduciary duties and oversight responsibilities naturally extend to the IPO 
process. Among other things, the board—directly or, for some matters, through 
committees—must make the threshold decision to pursue an IPO; select the managing 
underwriters; ensure that appropriate policies, controls, and procedures are in place; 
establish an appropriate governance structure; approve various matters related to the IPO; 
reassess compensation programs in the context of becoming a public company; oversee 
the preparation of the registration documents; and authorize the filing of, and sign them 
(Westenberg, 2011:10-8).  
 
A knowledgeable board that skillfully manages this process is expected to enhance the firm’s 
absorptive capacity – its ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) – with respect to the process of going public. Zahra and George (2002) argued 
that absorptive capacity is a set of knowledge creation routines by which firms acquire, 
assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge to produce a more dynamic organizational 
capability.  Because boards of directors have both economic and legal incentives to optimize the 
IPO process, we would expect them to use their knowledge to minimize or eliminate 
Research Note and Commentaries 
 
6 
 
underpricing.   Therefore, the collective knowledge assembled within the board should improve 
the effectiveness of the overall IPO process, which is generally considered to be a successful 
offering of stocks to public equity markets with minimal or nonexistent underpricing.  
 Previous KBV literature has suggested that knowledge can be characterized in two ways 
– its breadth and its depth (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).  In this case, the board’s breadth of 
knowledge refers to the extent to which its collective set of experiences and expertise spans 
multiple domains (i.e, general business knowledge).  For example, boards with relatively broad 
sets of general knowledge would be expected to exercise skill in managing the overall IPO 
process by selecting the most competent underwriters, allowing dissenting opinions within the 
boardroom to be aired, resolving conflicts in a timely fashion, and ultimately choosing the most 
appropriate offering price.   
In contrast, the depth of knowledge refers to the extent to which the board possesses 
highly sophisticated and specialized expertise regarding the technical aspects of the IPO process.  
For example, boards with relatively deep knowledge would be expected to exercise skill in 
navigating the technicalities of the new offering by bringing in legal, accounting, and financial 
expertise to bear on boardroom deliberations.   
In sum, boards of directors that possess a broad and/or deep knowledge base are expected 
to expand the firm’s absorptive capacity with respect to the IPO process.  This enhanced 
absorptive capacity should translate into a better managed IPO process, a more accurate offering 
price and therefore lower levels of underpricing. In contrast, boards lacking broad and/or deep 
levels of knowledge are expected to have more difficulty in managing the IPO process and 
assessing the firm’s true value. This lack of knowledge should translate into a lower offering 
price, and hence higher underpricing in order to attract potential investors and to avoid risk of 
partial subscription or selling of shares. This suggests the following two relationships:  
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Hypothesis 1a: The extent of general knowledge (i.e., knowledge breadth) possessed by 
the IPO firm’s board of directors will be negatively associated with IPO underpricing.  
Hypothesis 1b: The extent of technical knowledge (i.e., knowledge depth) possessed by 
the IPO firms’ board of directors will be negatively associated with IPO underpricing.   
Internal and external knowledge’s interactive effect on IPO underpricing 
The KBV is a theory of the firm, so its primary focus has been on the knowledge and learning 
occurring within the firm to influence organizational outcomes. However, knowledge workers 
within the firm often seek knowledge external to its boundaries, integrating that external 
knowledge with their internal knowledge to inform strategic choices (Grant, 1996). Hence, the 
KBV emphasizes that internal knowledge must be considered within the context of the external 
knowledge circulating within the firm’s environment (Nonaka, 1994; Reus et al., 2009).   
 Based on KBV and absorptive capacity literatures, we would expect that boards of 
directors with relatively broad and deep levels of knowledge are in a better position to take 
advantage of useful knowledge external to the firm than boards of directors with relatively low 
levels of knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002).  In other words, as boards expand the absorptive 
capacity of the firm, the KBV predicts that these more knowledgeable boards will be in a better 
position to be aware of, assimilate, and apply any or all relevant knowledge from the external 
environment in order to govern the corporation well (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). We therefore 
expect that internal knowledge is complementary with external knowledge as boards direct the 
IPO process.   
With respect to IPO underpricing, this suggests that the breadth or depth of knowledge 
operating within the board should enable the board to capitalize on the breadth or depth of 
knowledge external to the firm.  Specifically, boards possessing a relatively broad range of 
general knowledge and/or a relatively deep technical knowledge about the IPO event should be 
Research Note and Commentaries 
 
8 
 
better positioned to take advantage of extensive knowledge external to the firm.  For example, a 
board with a broad range of knowledge would be expected to operate with directors broadly 
knowledgeable about business in general, such as its overall understanding of the economy.  If 
these directors operated in an environment with relatively extensive available information on the 
overall economy, they should be better able to make decisions that enhance the IPO offering.   
Similarly, a board operating with relatively deep understanding of the technicalities 
associated with the IPO event operating within an external environment with relatively extensive 
information on the legal, accounting and financial aspects associated with IPOs should be better 
positioned to make decisions that enhance the IPO offering. For instance, board members with 
strong technical expertise may be better able to accurately price the firm’s share when 
information about related IPOs is available in the external environment, as such information 
allows them to utilize their knowledge capacity to assimilate and utilize such IPO-related 
external knowledge in the economy.  In sum, this literature and logic suggests that the state of 
knowledge within the board should complement the state of knowledge in the external 
environment.  More formally:  
Hypothesis 2a: The breadth of general knowledge possessed by the IPO firm’s board of 
directors will be more negatively associated with IPO underpricing when there is more 
extensive general and IPO-specific knowledge available in the environment in which the 
firm operates. 
Hypothesis 2b: The depth of technical knowledge possessed by the IPO firm’s board of 
directors will be more negatively associated with IPO underpricing when there is more 
extensive general and IPO-specific knowledge available in the environment in which the 
firm operates.   
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RESEARCH METHODS 
Data collection procedures 
The most common source of IPO data is the SDC Platinum database, provided by Thomson-
Reuters. However, due to considerable problems with its accuracy (see Ritter, 2012) and the 
absence of several important firm-level indicators required by our study, we resolved to hand-
collect our own dataset with a wide range of country experts intimately familiar with the 
environment of their designated economy. When the country experts and corresponding sample 
of countries had been selected, we utilized the annual editions of the EurIPO Fact Books (Paleari 
et al., 2006; Paleari et al., 2007; Paleari et al., 2008) to identify IPOs for these countries. Our 
study period ranges from 2006–2008 and covers both hot and cold market conditions that have 
been shown to influence IPO processes (Derrien, 2005).  
Data were collected through careful reading and analysis of IPO prospectuses by the 
country experts. All IPOs require a prospectus providing a general overview for potential 
investors to consider. Each prospectus contained the following two sets of information: (1) firm 
characteristics, (e.g., founding date, financial trends and offering price); and (2) details on key 
top managers and all board members, (e.g., age, ownership stakes, functional background and 
tenure with the firm).  
In order to guide data-gathering and ensure consistency, the project leaders developed a 
data-collection template that was distributed to all participating country experts. As Aggarwal et 
al. (2009) observed, there are important but subtle differences in governance measures 
throughout the world, and our research team was able to deliberate on these differences and 
reconcile them in a systematic fashion. The country experts collected and coded the firm-level 
variables according to this template. In several instances, country-specific queries raised by 
country experts were discussed and resolved by the project leaders in order to reflect country-
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specific peculiarities and ensure data consistency.  Overall, this process yielded a complete data 
set of 978 IPO firms from 17 countries representing over 60 percent of global GDP.   
Variables and measures 
In this study, we had one dependent variable - IPO underpricing.  Consistent with our earlier 
literature and logic, board knowledge was measured in terms of its breadth and depth (Bierly and 
Chakrabarti, 1996). Similarly, and based on prior research, we also distinguish between the two 
dimensions of breadth and depth for external knowledge (Barro and Lee, 2001; Ritter and Welch, 
2002). These dependent and independent measures, as well as our controls, mainly borrowed 
from agency theory and previous research done using U.S. samples, are listed in Table 1. The 
descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations for all our measures are listed in Table 2.   
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
Analytical method  
We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) as implemented in Stata 13.1 to test our 
hypotheses. This technique is appropriate because our observations are embedded in two 
hierarchically-nested levels of analysis – country and industry – that may be sources of non-
independence among observations (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The ICC(1) intra-class 
correlation coefficient is 0.28 at country level (p < 0.001) and 0.11 at industry level (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that the most important source of non-independence is the country level; we took this 
into account by specifying our model as a 2-level hierarchical model with observations nested in 
countries and controls for industries at the 2-digit ISIC 4 level.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 presents our 2-level HLM regression results. Model 1 contains only our control 
variables. The primary indicators for this base model are board, firm, industry, national and 
timing control measures. Notably, none of the agency predictors are systematically related to 
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IPO underpricing.  Model 2 shows the entire array of control measures, along with the two direct 
effects hypothesized by the KBV. All indicators of model fit improve modestly, and consistent 
with H1a and H1b, board knowledge breadth and board knowledge depth are both negatively 
associated with IPO underpricing. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 In Model 3, we regressed our controls, main effects and interaction effects of board and 
external knowledge breadth and depth. Indicators of fit improve significantly. Notably, all four 
interactions are statistically significant, but three are statistically significant opposite to the 
hypothesized direction. The only interaction demonstrating a complementary relationship was 
between board knowledge depth and external knowledge depth, though only marginal (p < .10). 
In sum, our data provide limited support for the complementary relationship proposed by the 
KBV in H2b.  In contrast, our data predominantly suggest a substitution relationship between 
internal and external knowledge with respect to IPO underpricing. Furthermore, we conducted 
several robustness tests using alternative national indicators, a variety of model specifications, 
and multiple tests to rule out endogeneity concerns. Our findings were robust, and specific 
details can be obtained by contacting the authors directly.   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study uses the KBV to describe and explain IPO underpricing across multiple levels of 
analysis for a broad cross-national sample of firms based in developed and emerging economies. 
Our results provide relatively strong support for its predictions related to board knowledge being 
inversely related to IPO underpricing. Specifically, both the breadth and depth of board 
knowledge were found to directly suppress IPO underpricing above and beyond our wide array 
of control variables.  
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Traditional knowledge-based literature and logic argues that “more knowledge is better” 
(Zahra and George, 2002). As a result, we hypothesized a complementary relationship between 
board knowledge and external knowledge and tested this prediction. Notably, all four of our 
interactions were significant, but three were in the opposite direction hypothesized, and the 
hypothesized relationship that was supported was only marginally significant. Specifically, it 
appears that boards with less knowledge benefit more from extensive external knowledge to 
overcome their knowledge gaps and to direct the IPO process with less underpricing.  In contrast, 
boards with more extensive internal knowledge may overestimate their own knowledge and may 
not fully utilize external knowledge sources. These substitution effects directly challenge 
traditional absorptive capacity logic within the KBV which argues for complementary effects.  
However, our findings are consistent with recent KBV studies, which have revealed that 
the specific relationship between external and internal knowledge depends on the nature of the 
situation. Specifically, Fernhaber et al. (2009) found that new ventures with limited 
internationally-experienced top management benefited most from external international 
knowledge sources, suggesting a substitution relationship, contrary to traditional absorptive 
capacity arguments. Furthermore, Xu, Wu and Cavusgil (2013) showed that external knowledge 
often substitutes for internal knowledge when the firm is pursuing radical innovation. Overall, 
this literature and our data seem to suggest that when a firm is confronted by non-routine and 
complex situations, external knowledge can and often does substitute for internal knowledge.  
The only instance where we found a complementary relationship between internal and 
external knowledge was with board knowledge depth and external knowledge depth. This 
finding suggests that the depth dimension of knowledge within the board coupled with the depth 
dimension of knowledge external to the firm is the only area where a complementary relationship 
between internal and external knowledge-sourcing may exist. In other words, it takes deep 
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knowledge within the board in order to access and utilize deep knowledge in the external 
environment.  While this finding was only marginally significant, its implications are interesting 
and significant for future KBV research because it highlights different interactive effects 
between the breadth and depth of knowledge internal and external to the firm.  
 In sum, we found that with respect to IPO underpricing, more knowledge is not always 
better when considering interaction between internal and external sources of knowledge. Our 
data suggest that when a firm is confronted by a non-routine complex decision, such as entering 
public equity markets, only the depth of internal knowledge is complementary with the depth of 
external knowledge. In contrast, all other interactions between internal and external knowledge 
lead to substitution outcomes.  While this is speculative, it may be that less knowledgeable 
boards are often more highly motivated to search out and rely on external knowledge than more 
knowledgeable boards are (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003).   
Conclusions and Implications 
The primary contribution of our study is to help demystify the IPO underpricing market anomaly 
by utilizing a new theoretical perspective and analyzing a broad sample of firms in a wide variety 
of economies using multi-level modeling techniques. Consistent with Lubatkin et al. (2005), we 
find that predictors based on the most popular theoretical framework for exploring underpricing, 
agency theory, have relatively little explanatory leverage in a cross-national context. 
Furthermore, we show that most of the variables found to be salient predictors of underpricing in 
the U.S. IPO market (i.e., prior growth, issue size, leverage, profitability, VC ownership) do not 
have much explanatory power in our cross-national sample.  
In contrast, our results suggest that KBV predictions regarding the extent of knowledge 
possessed by boards of directors are more powerful in explaining first-day IPO returns for a 
more globally-representative set of firms. In particular, our results indicate that broad and deep 
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knowledge possessed by the board of directors may enable the board to more properly manage 
the IPO process and accurately price the IPO prior to going public. Our findings also suggest that 
the external environment can often substitute for internal board knowledge, and that the joint 
knowledge impact varies in terms of breadth and depth considered. As such, our findings reveal 
that KBV dynamics often vary from economy to economy, depending on the knowledge 
possessed by the board and the extent of knowledge circulating within the overall economy. 
Consequently, previous KBV and underpricing insights generated just within the U.S. context 
may not be generalizable to other economies.  
In addition, we make an important methodological contribution to empirical research on 
IPO underpricing in particular, and cross-national research on corporate governance more 
generally. To our knowledge, this is the first study exploring multi-level explanations of IPO 
underpricing using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques in a cross-national sample. 
While Engelen and Van Essen (2010) used HLM to examine underpricing, their theoretical focus 
was exclusively on the effects of national legal frameworks on IPO outcomes. The vast majority 
of prior cross-national studies of IPO underpricing (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2011; Boulton et al., 
2010) applied ordinary least square (OLS) techniques to nested data in which individual 
observations are subject to both industry- and country-level effects. This approach likely violates 
the IID assumption of OLS, which may artificially reduce the standard errors of the estimates 
and inflate confidence levels (cf. Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Consequently, the statistical 
significance of these OLS-based findings may be in doubt. Using HLM, this paper takes into 
account these methodological issues and may set a standard for future research. 
Our study also makes important contributions to the literature on international corporate 
governance. First, our findings add empirical evidence to the argument that agency explanations 
may be rather limited in the global economy (Lubatkin et al., 2005), as this perspective largely 
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reflects governance peculiarities and the institutional context of established Anglo-American 
firms with dispersed ownership (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). If neoclassical economic 
assumptions are relaxed, the theoretical contribution of agency theory becomes rather restricted 
(Aguilera and Williams, 2009; Judge, Gaur and Muller-Kahle, 2010). Clearly, there will always 
be monitoring and control issues to which boards must attend. However, our study reveals that 
traditional structural proxies for monitoring and controlling the firm were inconsequential for 
explaining IPO underpricing in a cross-national context. At the very least, agency theorists 
should consider using alternative measures which more closely approximate actual board 
monitoring and control activities rather than the traditional structural proxies (Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003).  
Second, our study suggests that the KBV may be a useful alternative perspective for 
explaining corporate governance processes and outcomes. The KBV argues that firms with more 
extensive knowledge are advantageously positioned to perform in a knowledge-based global 
economy (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Our results show 
that this is not always the case, but it would be interesting to see if they can be extended also to 
other corporate governance outcomes in more mature and established firms.  
Third, our study strongly supports scholars arguing that national context influences 
corporate governance practices and outcomes; and that the Anglo-American governance 
environment is quite different from elsewhere (e.g., Judge et al., 2010; Li and Samsell, 2009; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In addition, our findings break new ground by exploring how the 
state of internal knowledge interacts with external knowledge to influence governance outcomes. 
As such, our study lends further support to the notion that country does indeed matter when 
attempting to understand organizational outcomes (Makino, Isobe and Chan, 2004).  
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 These empirical insights have a number of important practical implications. They show 
that board knowledge can have a substantive direct impact on IPO outcomes. Specifically, an 
increase in the board knowledge breadth by one standard deviation from the mean in an 
environment with external knowledge breadth one standard deviation below the mean changes 
underpricing from a mean of .31 (underpricing) to -.04 (overpricing).  This elimination of 
underpricing represents millions of dollars to pre-IPO investors for each IPO.  As such, treating 
the board as “window dressing” may not be a very practical decision (Chen, Hambrick and 
Pollock, 2008).   
A final practical implication of our analysis reveals that IPO underpricing is influenced at 
both the firm and national levels. Notably, the value of board knowledge appears to be most 
significant for less-developed economies, counter to Crossland and Hambrick's executive 
discretion research (2011). Clearly, we have just scratched the surface of our understanding on 
how cross-national corporate governance mechanisms interact to yield firm-specific outcomes in 
a globally-representative set of firms (Judge, 2009). The KBV warrants further studies to learn 
whether our findings hold in other time-periods using more refined measures of internal and 
external knowledge in other cross-national contexts.  
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Table 1. Variables and measures employed in this study 
Variable Measure and Recent Supporting Literature Source of data 
IPO underpricing Square root of the percentage price change from offer price to price 
at end of first trading day after adding constant. (End of First-day 
Market Price – Initial Offering Price) / Initial Offering Price 
(Arthurs et al., 2008). 
EurIPO database and 
local stock market 
exchange data 
Board knowledge 
breadth 
Board Experience: Average age of directors on the board at time of 
the IPO event (Thompkins and Hendershott, 2012) 
IPO prospectus 
Board knowledge 
depth 
Board Technical Expertise: The proportion of those on the board 
possessing technical expertise relative to IPO (i.e. law, accounting, 
or finance) was computed relative to overall board membership 
(McDonald and Westphal, 2010).  
IPO prospectus 
External 
knowledge breadth 
Educational Attainment: National index comprised of mean number 
of years of schooling for adults and children normalized on a 0 to 1 
scale (Barro and Lee, 2001) 
UN Human 
Development Project 
External 
knowledge depth 
IPO Activity: Number of IPOs issued during year of IPO by 
economy (Ritter and Welch, 2002) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream & market 
exchange data 
Board Ownership Proportion of shares held by directors relative to overall shares 
outstanding (Howton et al.,2001) 
IPO prospectus 
CEO Duality Coded 1 if CEO is also chairman of board, 0 otherwise (Chahine 
and Tohmé, 2009) 
IPO prospectus 
Outsider 
Proportion 
Proportion of outside directors on board relative to all members of 
board (Certo et al., 2001). 
IPO prospectus 
Issue Size Log transformation of total market proceeds earned at IPO event, 
US$ (Jain and Kini, 2000). 
EurIPO database 
IPO Age Log transformation of difference in years between IPO firm’s 
founding date and date of IPO (Daily et al., 2003).  
IPO prospectus 
IPO Leverage Log transformation of debt-to-equity ratio at time of IPO (Eckbo 
and Norli, 2005) 
Company financial 
statements 
IPO Growth Previous three years of sales growth registered by pre-IPO firm 
(Florin et al., 2003) 
Company financial 
statements 
IPO Profitability Average three years of return-on-assets by pre-IPO firm (Florin et 
al., 2003) 
Company financial 
statements 
Family Ownership Proportion of shares held by family members (Bruton et al., 2010) IPO prospectus 
Venture Capital 
Ownership 
Proportion of shares held by venture-capital investors (Bruton et al., 
2010) 
IPO prospectus 
Bank Ownership Proportion of shares held by banks (Bruton et al., 2010) IPO prospectus 
Government 
Ownership 
Proportion of shares held by governmental entities (Bruton et al., 
2010) 
IPO prospectus 
Primary Industry Dummy variables provided for 62 two-digit ISIC classifications 
(Shi et al., 2013) 
IPO prospectus 
Market Returns Total annual general stock-market returns for year of IPO by 
economy (Baker and Wurgler, 2007) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and local 
market exchange data 
Market Volatility Standard deviation of total annual general stock-market returns for 
year of IPO by economy (Baker and Wurgler, 2007) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and local 
market exchange data 
Market 
Capitalization 
Total stock-market capitalization for year of IPO by economy, in 
US$ (Baker and Wurgler, 2007) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and local 
market exchange data 
Year Two binary variables: IPO in 2006 and IPO in 2007 (Engelen and 
van Essen, 2010). 
EurIPO database 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix for IPO underpricing and its predictors in 17 countries (N = 978) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. IPO underpricinga 1.120 0.229 -              
2. Board ownership 27.80 25.25 -0.04 -             
3. CEO duality 0.389 0.488 -0.01 0.20 -            
4. Outsider proportion 65.40 20.48 0.01 -0.12 -0.22 -           
5. IPO ageb 1.901 1.084 -0.12 0.08 0.09 0.14 -          
6. IPO growthb 4.521 0.947 -0.11 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09 -         
7. IPO issue sizeb 4.993 1.983 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.04 -        
8. IPO leverageb 0.558 0.95 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.09 0.14 0.06 0.03 -       
9. IPO profitability -0.178 5.942 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 -      
10. Bank ownership 1.348 6.546 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -     
11. Family ownership 13.30 22.40 -0.05 0.34 0.21 -0.24 0.28 0.14 -0.06 0.22 0.04 -0.08 -    
12. Government ownership 1.419 9.018 0.07 -0.17 -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -   
13. Venture capital ownership 5.621 12.63 -0.11 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.15 0.07 0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 -0.18 -0.07 -  
14. Stock market capitalization 6,218 7,272 -0.07 0.24 0.09 0.38 0.15 0.08 0.12 -0.23 -0.01 -0.09 -0.24 -0.08 0.58 - 
15. Stock market returns 0.147 0.488 0.16 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
16. Stock market volatility 0.128 0.115 0.33 -0.13 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.18 0.16 -0.28 -0.43 
17. IPO in 2006 0.414 0.493 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.11 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.03 0.06 0.10 
18. IPO in 2007 0.377 0.485 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.11 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.12 
19. Board knowledge breadth 51.00 5.414 -0.23 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.16 
20. Board knowledge depth 0.497 0.252 -0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.12 -0.11 0.00 0.10 -0.16 -0.05 0.11 0.09 
21. External knowledge breadth 0.776 0.161 -0.32 0.12 -0.11 0.19 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.36 -0.02 0.09 -0.36 -0.13 0.39 0.53 
22. External knowledge depth 62.09 47.86 -0.22 0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.26 0.00 -0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.31 -0.16 0.22 0.52 
 
 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
16. Stock market volatility -0.43 -      
17. IPO in 2006 0.43 -0.39 -     
18. IPO in 2007 0.19 -0.31 -0.65 -    
19. Board knowledge breadth -0.04 -0.15 0.00 0.05 -   
20. Board knowledge depth -0.04 -0.29 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -  
21. External knowledge breadth -0.21 -0.54 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.30 - 
22. External knowledge depth 0.07 -0.63 0.38 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.44 
Notes: 
 a
 -Square root of (underpricing + 1);  
b
 - Log transformation + 1; 
Correlations >= .07 are significant at least at .05 level.  
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Table 3. Multilevel regression of board knowledge and external knowledge impact on IPO underpricing 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Variable 
 
βeta 
Standard 
Error 
 
βeta 
Standard 
Error 
 
βeta 
Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.985*** 0.085 0.988*** 0.084 1.013*** 0.086 
Controls:       
Board ownership -0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007 
CEO duality -0.023† 0.013 -0.022† 0.013 -0.026* 0.012 
Outsider proportion -0.010 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.007 
IPO age -0.018* 0.007 -0.015* 0.007 -0.017* 0.007 
IPO growth -0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
IPO issue size -0.009 0.006 -0.007 0.006 -0.009 0.006 
IPO leverage 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007 
IPO profitability 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 
Bank ownership -0.002 0.006 -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 
Family ownership 0.016† 0.009 0.016† 0.009 0.015† 0.009 
Government ownership -0.013† 0.007 -0.011† 0.007 -0.007 0.007 
Venture capital ownership 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
Stock-market capitalization 0.007 0.032 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.034 
Stock-market returns 0.011 0.0133 0.014 0.013 0.021 0.013 
Stock-market volatility 0.097*** 0.025 0.093*** 0.025 0.084** 0.026 
IPO in 2006 0.153** 0.057 0.137* 0.056 0.097 0.063 
IPO in 2007 0.176** 0.054 0.160** 0.054 0.128* 0.057 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-level predictors:       
Board knowledge breadth (BKB)   -0.016* 0.007 -0.017** 0.006 
Board knowledge depth (BKD)   -0.018** 0.013 -0.021** 0.007 
National-level predictors:       
External knowledge breadth (EKB)     -0.020 0.028 
External knowledge depth (EKD)     0.013 0.019 
Interaction effects:       
BKB x EKB     0.015* 0.007 
BKD x EKB     0.031*** 0.008 
BKB x EKD     0.017** 0.006 
BKD x EKD     -0.011† 0.007 
    
N 978 978 978 
Pseudo R
2
 0.300 0.312 0.358 
Log Likelihood 353.7 359.6 376.5 
Wald Chi-Square 167.3 181.2 222.7 
P ≥ Chi-squared change 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: IPO Underpricing was transformed using square root plus constant to avoid kurtosis and skewness problems;  
      Issue Size, IPO Age and IPO Leverage were log-transformed to assure normality; Industry dummies for 62  
      ISIC industries are included and specific details on coefficients can be provided upon request. 
      Pseudo-R
2
 calculated as: 1 - (residual variance) / (variance of square root of underpricing).  
      *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
 
